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THE PROBLEM OF TELEOLOGY.*

A word by way of introduction on the imperfection of the philosophic vocabulary in respect to the subject under discussion, and the manifest inconveniences which spring from this imperfection. The term teleology signifies the science of ends. It is the counterpart of ætiology, or the science of causes. Now, in the case of cause, we have at our disposal for use the word cause itself, the word causation expressive of the action of a cause, and the invaluable word causality, denoting the principle itself or the nexus that subsists between a cause and its effect. In the case of the concept end we have the word itself and its Greek equivalent *τέλος*, and we have, as before said, the word which denotes the science that discusses or defines ends; but we have no term corresponding to causation and no unambiguous and accepted term corresponding to causality. In consequence we meet, even in careful philosophic writings, with such roundabout and unprecise phrases as "teleological causation," intended to describe the effect of a purpose or end in producing its own realization, whereas it can properly mean only the kind of causation which teleology, or the science of ends, has in view. But as the kind of causation which teleology has in view is manifold; as teleology is that branch of philosophy in which of all others the least agreement

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has been achieved, the fundamental concepts of which are least clarified, it is evident that such a phrase as "teleological causation" is infelicitous and likely to be confusing. For the progress of any department of human knowledge, it is desirable that the vocabulary be unequivocal; that each term shall suggest one meaning and one only. The word teleology, according to a recent writer, suggests at least fourteen different meanings, and hence the use of teleological as a descriptive adjective is, to say the least, inconvenient. What we most require in our discussion is a counterpart of the term causality to designate the principle involved or the kind of nexus which connects means with end. The term finality is sometimes employed for this purpose. It is not free from objection because, in common parlance, it means "the quality or state of being final, or settled, or arranged." But it is also used with a more restricted philosophic connotation, in the sense just indicated, as the counterpart of causality, and I shall, in this sense, adopt it in my paper.

A critique of the principle of finality, then, is my task, or, rather, the outline of such a critique, for the limits of space at my disposal will hardly permit of more. There are two main positions which may be distinguished. The notion of finality may be employed as a principle for the scientific explanation of nature. It may be banished from the field of nature as a principle of explanation, though retained as a heuristic principle to cover the gaps that exist in our causal explanation, and be employed mainly in the ethical field. The first position is capable of being stated, and has been stated in various forms; by Paley, for instance, in his argument from "the marks of Design," by Lotze, and by the absolute idealists. Without entering into a consideration of these various positions, I shall briefly allude, for the sake of developing my own view, to that conception of finality which underlies the design argument as put forth by Paley. The gist of his argument has been put thus: A plurality of elements independent of each other, when so arranged as to produce a rational and valuable result, implies an architectonic intelligence which desired and fore-knew this

result. The point to be noted is, that the stress is laid upon the entire independence of the elements; upon their deadness, their mutual uncongeniality, their lack of relation to one another. The force of Paley's argument depends on the fact of co-operation together with the circumstance that there is nothing in the nature of the co-operating members to account for the co-operation. The wheels and weights and hands and dial of a clock, the parts of any mechanism, for instance, have no intrinsic affinity for one another. Anyone who should examine each part singly, aside from a knowledge which he might have of the purpose in the mind of the mechanician, could never, by any stretch of the imagination, hit upon the shape or character of the machine in which this part is to perform its function. The relation of means to ends in this view of finality, therefore, is that the end or purpose is imprinted *ab extra*; that the means themselves are wholly incapable, when considered in themselves, of explaining the result to which, under outside constraint, they contribute. They are combined into purposeful operation by the despotism of extraneous mind. The passivity, the inertness, of the means is the evidence relied on to demonstrate that the rational and valuable result which they conspire to produce, is a result not of their own contriving, but can only be explained as due to the working of a superimposed intelligence. As opposed to this extrinsic notion of finality, we have in modern times the intrinsic notion as set forth in schemes of so-called immanent teleology, the point of which is to show that the plurality of elements are induced to combine by an inherent affinity; that plan or purpose is, as it were, self-active in them; that they are somehow themselves informed with spontaneous intelligence.

The finality doctrine, to which Paley gives blunt expression, was shaken long before the days of Darwin. But it cannot be denied that the prevalence of the Darwinian theory has served more and more to discredit the extrinsic view of finality, even in the popular estimation. The chief objections which Darwinism has advanced may be shortly summarized as follows: First, as to the method. The method of nature in the apparent prosecution of ends is not such as to argue the sure touch, the

deliberate selectiveness of a planful intelligent author. The method of nature is marked by "wasteful prodigality and blundering indirection." It is compared, in a famous passage of Lange's "History of Materialism," to that of a hunter who should fire a million shots at random in every direction, finally in the millionth instance hitting the object of his pursuit. In such manner millions of seeds are wasted before one takes root; in millions of instances sentiency, intellectual and moral promise, are heedlessly crushed; and the results which nature achieves may be compared to the flowers that bloom in graveyards, or to the prolific vegetation which the traveler notes as he passes over some such battlefield as that of Gettysburg. The method then is characterized by wasteful prodigality and blundering indirection. The result is reached in haphazard, hit-or-miss fashion. It looks as if it were the outcome of a lucky chance rather than of purpose.

Secondly, the result achieved itself is far from answering what we should have expected if it had been the offspring of design and wisdom. Under this head belong the following considerations: (*a*) Forms of life are often imperfect in the sense of being ill-adjusted to the functions which they appear intended to fulfil. Of this the existence of rudimentary organs which impede rather than aid the living organism in which they are found, is a familiar example. (*b*) The living types which are satisfying in one sense—in the sense, namely, of being suited to their environment—are unsatisfying from another point of view, because the environment is not such as to call out or to tolerate what ideally we should consider the best. In popular phrase the strong survive, but not the good—not, at all events, the best. (*c*) There is no such thing as symmetrical progress. Progress is interrupted. Periods of progress are followed by periods of stagnation or of retrogression. The forward wave is checked, and in the reflux of the wave individuals, peoples and races are submerged. (*d*) In respect to such progress as there is, we have not the assurance that it will be continuous. In fact, the probabilities, regarded from a naturalistic point of view, are against its being so. If, nevertheless, we dare to affirm the hope that

the forward movement will somewhere and somehow reach its perfect climax, it is on faith and not on the evidence of facts that we must rest such a hope. (e) Finally, Darwinism inverts the time relation of the terms denominated means and ends, and thus completely alters their significance. According to pre-Darwinian teleology, the idea of the end precedes, in time, the adoption of the means necessary to realize the end. The divine optician to whom is ascribed the construction of the human eye has in mind, to begin with, the result to be achieved, and then assembles the parts of the eye in such a way as to attain that result. From the Darwinian point of view the opposite is the case. An eye appears first, or the rudimentary beginnings of an eye. Its occurrence is due to chance, and thereafter as a consequence, as the effect of a cause, there comes into operation the function of seeing. The statement is no longer believed that we are equipped with eyes in order that we may see, but it is said that we see because we happen to have eyes. In other words, finality is reduced to causality. The *telos* is no longer a target nor a final cause of which means are the effect; but the so-called means have turned into mechanical causes, and the *telos* (no longer rightly so denominated) is their mechanical effect.

I am not prepared to say that Darwinism has triumphed along the whole line and routed its adversary, the old teleology, beyond the possibility of its repairing its fortunes. Darwinism does not account for the fact that nature is so ordered as to make a correspondence possible between organisms and environment. There are two series of so-called chance occurrences, between which there must be a certain parallelism in order to give room for adaptation. An environment must exist suitable to the maintenance of life forms, and the variations that occur in the organisms must be of such a kind as to correspond with the changing conditions of the environment. It is perfectly conceivable that variations might occur *ad infinitum* in the life forms which should have no relation to surrounding conditions, in which case organisms would wholly disappear. The fact that they do not disappear depends on a correspondence between two sets of variations so arranged that the struc-

tural change shall appear at the propitious moment—at the moment when the environment is of such a kind as to provide the opportunity for the persistence and development of the living thing. Further, Darwinism does not account for the circumstance that, however brought about, there is, after all, an ascending scale of life forms; that is to say, of forms, which in their complexity, their more perfect integration and differentiation, increasingly correspond to the rational ideal of unity amid diversity. The Darwinian, indeed, is in a position to maintain that the concurrence of the two series of variations is fortuitous; that amid the infinite number of chances the chance of this concurrence is one; and, as to the ascending series of types, he is able to affirm, without convincing contradiction on our side, that it is a mere *lusus naturae*, or sport, which is perfectly compatible with the doctrine of chance, and does not of necessity point beyond it. The fundamental criticism that applies to Darwinism, when conceived of, not as a working hypothesis, but as a theory of life, is based on our inability to accept the notion of chance as final; or, more precisely, the causal interpretation of nature as final. We are therefore compelled to admit that the superintending intelligence of the old teleology as a possibility has not been excluded, but the demonstrative force of the argument from “the marks of Design” has been broken. The claims of that argument on our acceptance, on grounds of experience, have been incalculably diminished by the inverted view of the origin of organs to which Darwinism has given currency.

The problem of pre-Darwinian teleology turned about the question whether the course of nature gives evidence of the operation of a planful intelligence similar in kind to the human artificer, however different in degree. The human artificer,—mechanic, architect, optician, was ever in the background,—was indeed the model on which the conception of a supreme architectonic intelligence had been fashioned. That the anthropomorphic pattern can thus be extended to nature was rendered doubtful, as we have just seen by the Darwinian theory. Darwinism delivered a front attack on the old teleology and shook it to its foundations. But, at the same time, a

far more insidious enemy appeared—an enemy who endeavored to destroy the teleological position by undermining it. If the question heretofore had been whether the principle of finality which is operative in human actions can be extended to nature, this new foe undertook to abolish the principle of finality from human action itself; to show that a true *telos*, a true purpose, even in the field of human conation, does not exist, and if not there, then nowhere else. If the Darwinian attack had made it questionable whether the human pattern can be applied to nature, the psychological attack undertook to reinterpret the human pattern itself, and to reduce finality, even in the case of man, to mere causality in disguise. The difficulty now is to justify the use of the term *telos* at all. For the notion of *telos*, or end, implies a certain finalness; implies, or seems to imply, a certain arrest in the ceaseless flux of antecedents and consequents; implies that the term of the causal series to which it is affixed stands forth at least in momentary fixity. And, if this be so, the prime question to decide is, whether there be such a thing as an end of pursuit for man; whether the so-called end is not an illusion. It is to this question that I shall now ask attention, and I shall endeavor to justify the notion of end by showing its relevancy and its indispensableness in the ethical field.

Kant defines an act of volition to be “an act which is determined by the anticipatory idea of the result of the act,” but he fully admits that the forecast or anticipatory idea is the inevitable effect of precedent conditions, such as temperament, education—we should, perhaps, add heredity and the like; and in a well-known passage he says that if the whole history of the subject could be known, the voluntary acts of a man might be predicted with the same certainty as an eclipse. The metaphysical argumentation, by which he endeavors to reconcile this inflexible causality with freedom, need not here detain us.

The tendency of modern psychology is to proceed with more trenchant affirmation along the same path. All voluntary acts, we are told, depend on the memory of involuntary acts of the same sort previously performed. An impulsive quality or a tendency to issue in movements resides in all ideas what-

soever, provided they possess a certain degree of intensity. The mystery of volition is not thus explained, but is generalized. The conative impulse, which we are accustomed to associate with certain ideas called ends, is the property of all ideas whatsoever. Any idea which can manage to occupy the focus of consciousness against its competitors is sure to eventuate in appropriate action. It is true there are certain cases in which William James, for instance, leaves room for an express fiat or consent, for a "sheer heave" of the will by means of which an idea naturally feeble is fortified and held in place; but when he speaks in this wise James speaks in the character of the metaphysician. The psychologist as a psychologist tends to abolish the notion of finality altogether; to submerge it in causality. Are we able to rescue the conception of finality from his hands? Are we able to define the notion in such a way as to satisfy the requirements of moral science and practice without affronting the causal conception of the physical scientist? It is this object which I have in mind. I should like to contribute toward justifying the concept of finality, primarily in view of and for the sake of its ethical uses. Before doing so I shall briefly refer to Paulsen's attempt to establish a basis for a new teleology, and then, as succinctly as possible, shall indicate my own thought.

Paulsen says we regard the result of a movement as an end, in case it was willed and in case the result is felt with satisfaction. As regards the former part of this definition, one is at a loss what to make of it. Paulsen lays down two requirements in defining *telos*. The first is that the result of an action was willed; the second that it is felt with satisfaction. But what does he understand by will? He expels from the notion of will the pre-existence in consciousness of the idea of the result. He thus assimilates the operation of volition in man to the movements of plants and even to the processes of crystallization. There remains, as the specific difference which distinguishes the ends pursued by human beings from results of physical movements like the processes of crystallization, just the fact that in the case of men the results achieved are felt with satisfaction. One gets the impression that Paulsen's

voluntarism is a kind of automatism with sentiency, in the case of man and higher animals, superadded.

The problem is, how to account for the finality which attaches to an end. The procession of causes goes on without interruption, like a gang of prisoners marching in lock-step. Each cause takes hold of its effect; each effect becomes in turn cause of a subsequent effect. The notion of end implies that some terms of the series are singled out above others for the mind to rest on, and are conceived as themselves in a state of rest. Does feeling—the feeling of satisfaction of which Paulsen speaks—account for the repose, the arrest? But satisfaction is merely another name for the very phenomenon which we find it so difficult to grasp. Satisfaction means fullness, repletion; a cessation of the striving or outward-passing movement. Satisfaction is but another designation for the halt, however temporary, which we conceive to have taken place in the causal flux when we speak of ends; and to say, therefore, that the feeling of satisfaction explains the finality, is tantamount to saying that the feeling of a thing explains the thing. To transfer the arrest, as Paulsen seems to do, from the causal series to an essence or nature somehow standing aloof from the series and evaluating results as they appear, and to assert that this feeling is an ultimate datum beyond which we are not at liberty to extend our curiosity—this is but to elude the difficulty and not to remove it; for, in the first place, feeling, apart from the bodily changes and the mental representations of which it is the feeling, is perfectly empty. A feeling of satisfaction, or of a halt without a corresponding halt, having actually occurred, is inexplicable.

In the second place the feelings are purely subjective—infinitely variable from moment to moment even in the same individual, and in different individuals incomparable and incommensurable save in terms of the ideational elements to which they correspond. But an end or *telos* cannot be merely subjective any more than there can be a subjective cause. There cannot be such a thing as a cause private to the mental apprehension of a single individual. Every true cause is public; is objective. It is an antecedent which, though for the

time being it may be recognized only by a single person of larger mental grasp than his fellows, must be capable of recognition by all rational beings when sufficiently developed to repeat the observations and follow the reasoning of the original discoverer. And in like manner there can be no private or subjective ends. A subjective end is a caprice or whimsy, and not an end at all. An end is an objective limit of pursuit; is a result which all normally constituted minds must accept as binding upon activity the moment they are able to understand the terms in which it is expressed. And, since the very nature of a *telos* is thus bound up with its objective validity, it follows that subjective feeling, infinitely variable as it is in the same individual and incommensurable as between different individuals, cannot supply the foundation on which to rest the conception of end.

It may be objected to this that the case, as it has just been put, against the feelings, is over-stated; that there are normal feelings of a physical kind, such as the gratification which follows the satisfaction of the appetites, normal æsthetic feelings, normal intellectual and moral feelings, such as the feeling of love and reverence toward parents and the like. My reply is, that even these feelings are by no means normal in the sense of being exactly alike in different individuals, but only in the sense that they exhibit a certain resemblance; and, aside from this, that their normal or objective character, so far as it exists, is borrowed from the objective changes in the external world or the objective ideational relations to which they correspond. It is not my purpose to depreciate the important role which the feelings play in the economy of human life. Without the feeling of rightness, as William James has truly said, rightness as such would be a mere neutral or cold mental perception, devoid of the power to warm the heart or to stir the will into action. The feelings are the response of our whole being to the sensory stimuli that come from without, and to the ideational appeals that derive from within. It may be that the very core of the mystery of our being is hidden in these responses. All I maintain is, that if we wish to become intelligible to one another, if we wish to secure normality in the feelings themselves and

objectivity in the acts which they prompt, especially in the case of the higher class of feelings with which we are here concerned, we must resort to the ideational elements which they follow as satellites. And if there be such a thing as a feeling of satisfaction, it is in some note or characteristic combination which distinguishes the ideational elements that we must seek the justification of the conception of end, and not in the emotional counterpart of these ideational elements.

And now for the thesis which I wish to submit. The error generally committed, as I conceive, has been to seek for the *telos* along the line of a single causal series. The notion of *telos* is a bond that ties together a number of parallel causal series. An end may be defined as a term in a causal series, the existence of which, as end, depends on the simultaneous existence of corresponding or complementary terms, likewise ends, in other series. There is no such thing as a single end. An end is what it is only in a society of ends. By the same process and at the same instant in which it constitutes other ends, it becomes itself an end. The notion of an end is not properly orientated toward the series of antecedents which are called means leading up to it. These should more strictly be called causes producing their effect. The notion of end is properly orientated toward those simultaneous ends that flash up like answering lights in related series, beacon answering beacon as soon as the first torch of *telos* has been kindled. In fine, the concept end is a social concept; a systemic concept. The concept end cannot be justified by means of the category of sequence, namely, causality; but by means of the category of co-existence, namely, reciprocity. The several ends, it is true, lie each in its own causal series; but it is not their relation to the terms preceding them in the series that constitutes them ends, but their relation to parallel or complementary terms in other series with which they stand in systemic connection. An end is an element of a system, every other element of which is likewise an end.

Now, as member of a system, it may be considered in two ways: as a *terminus ad quem* and as a *terminus a quo*. As a *terminus ad quem*—that is, as constituted and sustained by the

associate members of a system, it is an end in the strictest acceptation of the word. As a *terminus a quo*— that is, as helping to constitute and sustain the associate members of its system, it is also a means. Every end is both end and means, and means not in its relation to causal antecedents in the same series, but means in its relation to its co-relative ends. It is possible to use the word means in two senses. In common parlance, and even in philosophic writings, these senses are not distinguished as they ought to be, and hence often confusion results. The ethical vocabulary, as I have already remarked in the beginning, is not sufficiently elaborated or clarified. In the one sense means is equivalent to a precedent term in the causal sequence—a term which is merely ministerial, merely leads up to what follows; a part of the general flux in which there is no halt, no arrest; which lacks altogether the quality of finality. In the other sense the word signifies an element of a system containing an implicit cross-reference to corresponding terms of related causal sequences. It signifies a term or element which is at one and the same time means and end, which is both relatively dependent and relatively independent, and which in so far justifies the arrest, the halt, the quality of finality which we have been discussing, and which is the crux and mystery of all teleology.

The fallacies thus far met with are due, in my view of the matter, to the persistent attempt to reconcile causality and finality by deriving the latter from the former. The two are to be kept distinct. They stand for two separate principles. Finality is as much a part of the aboriginal equipment of the mind as causality. They are to be harmonized by showing that they apply to different sets of conditions or problems. The category of causality establishes the nexus of necessity between antecedent and consequent in the same causal sequence. The category of finality establishes a relation of unity or synthesis, or co-operation between different parallel and co-existent causal sequences. There is at least no contradiction, to my mind, in assuming a distinct point of view for the latter purpose. There is no contradiction in supposing that we are supplied with a separate mode for apprehending these cross-references between

related terms of simultaneous causal series, just as we are supplied with a mode for apprehending the connection between anteriors and posteriors of the same series. If finality is an ultimate, we cannot of course explain it; but there is at least no contradiction to causality involved in supposing that certain terms, as they arise in the causal series, carry with them this earmark of cross-reference, and that this earmark or note is a factor not accounted for by precedent causes, though not at variance with them.

It is true that the gist of my contention, namely, that such a thing as a single end is unthinkable, is seemingly opposed to everyday experience. Do we not pursue isolated, marked-off ends all the time without at least the consciousness of their being connected with any congeners? We concentrate attention on the quest of food. The satisfaction of the appetite is for the time the only end we have in view, and we take the steps necessary to secure it; or we seek shelter and warmth, and for the time these are our ends; or some intellectual object is the aim. And how entirely it seems possible to restrict one's self to a single end appears to be proved by the example of the scholar who spends years of his life in the study of a minute point in philology, or of the scientific investigator who conducts experiment after experiment with a view to testing a single formula. Nevertheless reflection will show that appearances in this respect are deceitful. Even of the physical wants it holds true that each one of them, though it may come into consciousness singly, is conditioned by a complex structure or organism, and could only arise in connection with such an organism. There would be no such thing in the case of the higher animals at all events, as hunger and the quest for food which it incites, were there not also thirst, sexual desire, etc. Even physical need exists only in company with other needs, the physical end in the society of other ends. Still more is this true of the intellectual and volitional ends.

I have just used the word *organism*—used it reluctantly, and yet have been forced to use it for lack of a better. Yet it is necessary, at this last and most important turning point of my argument, to be careful lest by the associations which the word

organism calls up, I may misrepresent and falsify the idea I wish to convey. I have said "physical ends" and "organism," meaning thereby the animal body. In reality I do not believe that we can properly speak of physical ends, or that the word organism can properly be applied to the animal body. An organism is not a substantive thing at all, but a spiritual idea. By organism we understand: 1. A system which completely expresses the plurality implicit in an underlying unity; the totality of the parts that make up the whole. 2. And, *per consequence*, a system of members, no one of which could be spared; each one of which is indispensable in its place and unique as expressing some aspect of the whole not expressed by its fellow members. 3. And again, *per consequence*, a system in which each member is both means and end in the sense above defined; is both *terminus ad quem*, constituted and supported by the system, and *terminus a quo*, constituting and supporting the system. Measured by these tests, it turns out that the so-called organisms are not true organisms. Of no living body can it be shown that it represents the total plurality implicit in an underlying unity. Of no living body can it be shown that its so-called organs are indispensable in their places to such an extent that some other possibly more perfect organs might not be substituted in their stead. Of no living body can it be shown that the various organs perfectly support and maintain one another in their functions; that they are so adapted to each other as to secure reciprocally the highest fulfilment of function. They are called organisms because, to some extent, but most inadequately, they approximate to or adumbrate to the scheme of relations which the term organism postulates; but they are not true organisms. They are not models upon which we are to fashion our conception of the organic relation. On the contrary, they borrow the distinction of being called organisms from the light of the purely spiritual organic idea, the illumination of which is reflected upon them.

It follows, and this is my final proposition, that the notion of end as being bound up with the notion of organism, exists in idea only and not in fact; that it cannot serve us in the busi-

ness of explaining nature at all, but only of evaluating it; and that its principal use must be found in that field where ideas display their highest potency, namely, in the ethical field. The organic idea, the teleological idea, the principle of finality, is a directive of conduct. We are so to act as to convert human society into an organism, or rather ever to work in asymptotic approximation toward that ideal, though we know well that under finite conditions we shall never attain it. We are to regard each human being not as if he were already an end *per se*, but in such a way as to help him to become a *telos*, a true member of an organic system; that is to say, a personality, a distinctive self, unique in his expression of mental and moral possibility, and therefore indispensable in his place.

And it is in this direction that I see the lines of a new construction in ethics; of a new foundation for ethics. Not altruism, with its so-called good of others for an aim, nor egoism, with its *soi-disant* good of self, nor the Kantian formula, with the mathematical notion of equality underlying it; not the evolutionary formula, with its outlook on a general happiness which cannot even be defined, but just the idea of organism in its spiritual sense is, for me, the beginning of ethics—the beginning and the end. To express this highest idea, of which we are capable so far as possible in the finite material of human relations, is the aim. So act as to elicit what is autotelic (that is, mentally and morally unique) in the self of others, and thereby develop what is autotelic in thyself is the formula which I should choose.

The technical point of my paper lies in the contention that the end must not be sought in a single causal series; that there is no such thing as a single end, but that the very concept of end is social. The outcome, so far as the problem of teleology is concerned, is that there are no ends in nature, except such as ethically we read into nature. And therefore, also, there can be no such thing as an immanent teleology; for an immanent teleology would require that it be proved that the idea had also become fact—a proof which can never be furnished. The true field of teleology is in the realm of ethics. But after we have found and justified the concept *telos* there, we can then apply

it, by way of interpretation and not of explanation, to the universe at large. We can dwell on such analogies to the organic idea as we see in the structure and functions of living bodies; we can contemplate the whole of nature as shimmering in the radiance of the ethical ideal. For the primacy belongs to the will, the crisis and climax of our being is in action, and the principle of finality which we find necessary for the regulation of conduct may, therefore, be extended for the purpose of ethical evaluation to the entire scheme of things.

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THE ETHICS OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE.

We are face to face in England to-day with a curious contretemps in educational matters, which is assuming considerable proportions. We have grown accustomed to such characteristic phenomena as "conscientious objectors" in respect to vaccination, and the objectors to medical attendance on the part of the "Peculiar People," and later in the case of "Faith-healers and "Christian Scientists." These cases have been so exceptional and isolated in this country that they have attracted comparatively little attention, and possibly may be more easily justified on the ground that they are not likely to become a "universal law," according to Kant, than the present movement. The revolution of feeling in England, however, threatens to become somewhat serious; and as it seems probable that it will increase rather than decrease in the course of time, it calls for consideration and comment. Already nearly ten thousand summonses have been issued, and it is said that there are not less than sixty thousand "Passive Resisters" in England. The movement has its political and its distinctively religious aspect, whilst being an educational problem. Its moral bearings and issues are those with which we are now immediately concerned, and possibly these are the most important in the long run. These issues are rendered still more