Zionism in National Socialist Jewish Policy in Germany, 1933-39*

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Support for Zionism from the non-Jewish world has been motivated through the years by a variety of factors. They have included not only feelings of justice, sympathy, idealism and guilt on the part of liberals, but the imperial interests of the Great Powers in the Middle East and elsewhere, and the anti-Semitic inclinations of nationalist and racist ideologues and politicians. Examples pertaining to the first two factors are numerous and well-known; it is the third factor to which this essay will address itself.

The Zionist concept of a separate Jewish Volk with its own homeland appealed to many anti-Semites late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth centuries. Its appeal lay in the Zionist rejection of Jewish assimilation into the gentile majority, and in the Zionist aim of creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine capable of drawing Jewish immigrants from Europe. As one of the developing völkisch nationalisms of central and eastern Europe in the nineteenth century, and as a response to the anti-Semitic tendencies and excesses in those national movements, Zionism has accepted the premise that the Jewish people, for religious, cultural or historical reasons, should not be assimilated. To a degree, it shared with anti-Semites a common acceptance of the völkisch inviolability and separateness of the different peoples of the world, and the necessity of a völkisch basis for the nation state. Moses Hess, a German Jew and one of the earliest proponents of political Zionism in the nineteenth century, published Rom und Jerusalem in 1862, to which Theodor Herzl later owed much of his inspiration. In his treatise, he argues against the idea of Jewish emancipation and assimilation as the solution to the Jewish question, and accepts the premise that, for Jews as well as for gentiles, nation states must preserve the völkisch inviolability and separateness of their peoples.1

Some of the leading anti-Semitic theorists of late nineteenth century Germany addressed themselves to the fledgling Zionist movement, and its role in the solution of Europe's "Jewish Question." Eugen Dühring advocated herding the Jewish people

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together in a state somewhere outside of Europe. Heinrich von Treitschke regarded anti-Semitism as a necessary evil, a natural reaction of the German Volksgefühl against a foreign element which itself never intended to assimilate. His solution was Jewish emigration and the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine or elsewhere. Heinrich Class of the Pan-German League proposed sending European Jewry to Palestine. The so-called "Political Anthropologists," an anti-Semitic school of thought led by Ludwig Woltmann and dedicated to proving the virtues of racial purity and German superiority, supported the Zionist goal of resurrecting Jewish national life. Houston Stewart Chamberlain referred not unfavorably to suggestions that the Jewish people be returned to Palestine. Political Economist Werner Sombart, who blamed the Jews for many of the abuses and negative aspects of the capitalist system in his work Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben, became an avid supporter of the Zionist cause before, during and after the First World War.

Anti-Semitic attitudes toward Zionism during the last half of the nineteenth century were also conditioned by the developing idea of an international Jewish conspiracy to subvert and eventually dominate the gentile World. Both Dühring and Chamberlain postulated the conspiracy theory in their works; they argued that the Zionist movement was simply a vehicle for the promotion of the conspiracy, seeking to create a power base in Palestine from which to direct its subversive efforts. The conspiracy theory became a fundamental concept upon which Nationalist Socialist Jewish policy was based; for National Socialism, the Jewish question theoretically was not simply one of separating Jews from Germans, but one of conflict and struggle between the two for control of the world.


7 Werner Sombart, Die Zukunft der Juden (München, 1912), pp. 31-36, 39, 48, 52, 58, 85-87.

8 See: Dühring, p. 127; Chamberlain, p. 387.
Until the spring of 1920, Hitler's speeches dealt with the Jewish question as a purely domestic issue. Questions such as citizenship, alleged Jewish responsibility for Germany's defeat and post-war plight, the Ostjuden, alleged Jewish domination of the cultural and economic life of the country, and the desirability of promoting Jewish emigration made up the subject matter of his speeches. The Party Program of 24 February 1920, treated the Jewish question as a matter of domestic German politics. By the end of May, however, Hitler began to place his struggle against the Jews on an international level for the first time. More emphasis was placed on the international dimensions of the Jewish question, specifically on the alleged international Jewish conspiracy against Germany. This shift in emphasis reflected the growing influence of Alfred Rosenberg on Hitler and the Party after 1920.

Rosenberg had developed his main theoretical contributions to National Socialism before he left his native Estonia in 1918, namely that Bolshevism and Zionism were instruments.


of a world Jewish conspiracy. He had been strongly influenced by Houston Stewart Chamberlain's theories on the alleged Jewish conspiracy, and came to regard himself as Chamberlain's disciple and successor. His ideas were readily accepted by Dietrich Eckart, who had been preaching the conspiracy theory in his anti-Semitic newspaper Auf gut Deutsch, before Rosenberg arrived in Munich. Rosenberg provided substance for Eckart's conspiracy arguments, and at the same time, presented himself as an authority with first-hand experience.

It is likely that some notion of an international Jewish conspiracy had already been known to Hitler. It is difficult to determine whether Hitler had ever read and digested the theories and ideas of Chamberlain and Dühring. We do know, however, that Hitler had been influenced by Theodor Fritsch, one of the more important and widely-read anti-Semites in pre-war Germany. Fritsch dealt with the conspiracy theory in his Handbuch der Judenfrage, a work which Hitler greatly admired. Rosenberg provided the substance for the vague notions of a Jewish conspiracy which already existed in the minds of Hitler, Eckart and others by identifying Bolshevism and Zionism as the dual instruments of that conspiracy. The significance of the alleged Jewish-Bolshevik link for future Nazi policy cannot be underestimated; the link between the Zionist movement and the alleged conspiracy became a source of conflict within Party and government circles during the 1930s in the formulation and execution of Jewish policy.

14 Cecil, pp. 17-18; Cohn, p. 194. The following early works by Rosenberg deal with the alleged link between the international Jewish conspiracy and the Bolshevik revolution: Die Spur des Juden im Wandel der Zeiten (München, 1920); Totengräber Russlands (München, 1921); Unmoral im Talmud (München, 1920); Pest in Russland. Der Bolschewismus, Seine Haupter, Händlanger und Opfer (München, 1922).

15 Chamberlain's influence on Rosenberg is evident in Rosenberg's Houston Stewart Chamberlain als Verkünder und Begründer einer deutschen Zukunft (München, 1927). Chamberlain's conspiracy theory fell far short of the ideas which Rosenberg, with the aid of the so-called "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," developed and brought to Germany. Chamberlain never accepted the authenticity of the "Protocols," arguing instead that a natural process of destruction had been taking place over a period of centuries, without the deliberate, secret scheming described in the "Protocols." See: Cecil, p. 79.

Rosenberg's conspiracy theory was based on the so-called "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," with which he had become familiar as a student in Moscow during the summer of 1917. The "Protocols" were brought to Germany in 1918/1919 by refugees fleeing the Bolshevik revolution, among them Alfred Rosenberg, and a German translation first appeared in 1919. They provided the link between Rosenberg's imagined conspiracy and the Zionist movement.

Three of Rosenberg's early works, as well as several articles in the Völkischer Beobachter during those years, provide an accurate description of his approach to the Zionist movement. Der Staatsfeindliche Zionismus, published in 1922, was Rosenberg's major contribution to the National Socialist position on Zionism. It represents in part an elaboration of ideas already expressed in the Völkischer Beobachter and in other published works, notably Die Spur. Rosenberg attacked the German Zionist movement as an organization actively engaged in a legalized subversion of the German State, and accused it of having betrayed Germany during the war by supporting Britain's Balfour Declaration and pro-Zionist policies. He further charged that the Zionists had actively worked for a German defeat and for the Versailles settlement as the best way of obtaining a Jewish national home in Palestine. He went on to assert that the interests of Zionism were first and foremost those of world Jewry, and by implication, the international Jewish conspiracy. He argued that loyalty to Zionist and Jewish interests was incompatible with loyalty to the German Fatherland.

More fundamental than pro-English, self-interest or conflict of interest accusations in Rosenberg's position on Zionism was the unshakable conviction that the world Jewish conspiracy was a monolithic phenomenon, uniting Zionists and assimilationists alike in a common front to undermine and destroy the gentile world. This argument implied that all Jews were Zionists in the end, and that the liberal/assimilationist Jew did not exist. Rosenberg dismissed Zionist claims that they merely wanted to create a refuge in Palestine for persecuted Jews from Eastern Europe. He presented this argument within the context of past anti-Semitic notions about

17 For an account of the origins of the "Protocols" and the subsequent discovery of their forgery, see: Cecil, pp. 72-73; Cohn, pp. 25-40, 71 ff; Schubert, p. 24.

18 See: Die Spur; Der Staatsfeindliche Zionismus (Hamburg, 1922; Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion und die jüdische Weltpolitik (München, 1923). See also: Völkischer Beobachter Nr. 14, 17.II.21, and Nr. 62, 7.VIII.21. One of his later works also concentrates on the same theme: Der Weltverschwörer-Kongress zu Basel (München, 1927).

19 Rosenberg, Der Staatsfeindliche Zionismus, p. 16.

20 Ibid., p. 25; Die Spur, pp. 106-7.

21 Rosenberg, Der Staatsfeindliche Zionismus, pp. 58-60.
Jewish inferiority and treachery. According to Rosenberg, the Jews had neither the capability to create a state in the European sense nor the intention of making that an end in itself. Instead, he asserted that Zionism sought the establishment of an independent base in Palestine, a "Jewish Vatican," from which to promote the alleged international conspiracy to subvert and to dominate the rest of the world.22

These theories represented one side of what was the double-edged nature of Rosenberg's approach to Zionism. Implicit in his arguments was the justification for encouraging and utilizing the Zionist movement in Germany to facilitate the dissimilation and emigration of Germany's Jewish population. In Die Spur, written in 1919 and published in 1920, Rosenberg suggested that the German Zionist movement should be encouraged and supported so that it might promote an exodus of German Jews to Palestine.23 He further singled out the Zionists from other Jewish organizations in Germany as a group with some potential for short-term cooperation with a future National Socialist Germany in the matter of halting Jewish assimilation, and promoting Jewish emigration.24 He also intended to use the Zionist philosophy as legal justification for depriving German Jews of their civil rights. The Zionist argument that there existed a separate Jewish Volk, with its own cultural and national interests, could be used against what Rosenberg considered to be a monolithic Jewish community.25 These ideas and suggestions were eventually transformed into policy after 1933.

Hitler's first major speech alluding to an international Jewish conspiracy was delivered in Munich on 31 May 1920.26 He warned against the twin evils of international capitalism and the international working class movement, labeling them instruments of the Jewish conspiracy. On 13 August 1920, Hitler delivered his first comprehensive speech on the Jewish question at an NSDAP meeting in Munich.27 Entitled "Warum Wir gegen die Juden sind," the speech contained Hitler's first observations on the Zionist movement. His observations were essentially the same as those made by Rosenberg in Die Spur and two years later in Der Staatsfeindliche Zionismus. Hitler argued that the Jews did not possess the Fähigkeit zur Staatenbildung. Moreover, he asserted that the Zionists were interested not merely in establishing a refuge for the persecuted

22 Ibid., pp. 62-63, Der Weltverschwörer-Kongress, pp. 20-23; Protokolle, p. 27.


24 Rosenberg, Der Staatsfeindliche Zionismus, p. 63.

25 Ibid.

26 BA: NS/26-51.

Jews of the world, but that they were seeking to create an independent power base from which to promote their alleged conspiracy. He later re-interated these arguments in *Mein Kampf* and in his *Zweites Buch.*

There is some evidence that Hitler, like Rosenberg, was prepared to encourage Zionist emigration from Germany to Palestine in spite of the ideological incompatibility engendered by the conspiracy theory. In a speech at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich on 6 July 1920, Hitler asserted that the Jews belonged in Palestine, and that it was only there that they could expect their full civil rights. Several anonymous articles appeared in the *Völkischer Beobachter* in the spring and summer of 1920 which supported Zionist efforts to move Jews from Germany to Palestine. Even Julius Streicher, in a speech before the Bayerischer Landtag on 20 April 1926, argued that German Jews should emigrate to Palestine rather than stay in Germany. It is likely that these views were supported by both Rosenberg and Hitler.

The dual nature of the National Socialist approach to Zionism was clearly established by Hitler and Rosenberg during the early 1920s, and became the basis of the regime's policy on Zionism after 1933. This question must be considered within the context of the on-going debate over Nazi Jewish policy as a whole, specifically the problems of continuity and authority. The thesis that the holocaust was the final stage in a master plan that had been drawn up during the early years of the National Socialist movement has been countered with arguments that the absence of a consistent, centralized authority in Jewish policy after 1933 precludes the existence of a blueprint for systematic action.

31. BA:NS/26-508.


The debate has been further stimulated by a recent study which suggests that Hitler was not responsible for the formulation and execution of the "final solution." See: David Irving, *Hitler's War* (N.Y., 1977).
That there was a continuity of ideas within the NSDAP regarding the future of Jews in Germany cannot be denied. Many of the anti-Jewish measures of the 1930s represent the realization of the demands of Nazi propaganda during the Weimar years, and one might tie the mass murder of millions of European Jews during World War II to veiled threats of physical liquidation made by Hitler during the early 1920s. However, a general continuity of ideas does not necessarily mean the existence of a systematic plan with one fixed, final solution as its ultimate end. Such a plan would have required a consistent, centralized policy-making authority, moving the entire process toward a pre-determined solution to the European Jewish question as a whole. Instead, Hitler remained relatively aloof from Jewish policy after 1933, which resulted in a proliferation of so-called Jewish Referate in most government and Party agencies, each promoting its own interests and influence in an effort to gain control over Jewish policy. This phenomenon, so characteristic of the Nazi system in general, and so particularly evident in all aspects of Jewish policy, especially in the question of Zionism, has been called Autoritäre Anarchie and the Polykratie des totalen Staates.

Until 1938, Jewish policy had been almost exclusively under the authority and control of government ministries, specifically the Ministry of the Interior, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economics. The Foreign Office, continuing in the same vein as it had during the Weimar years, was very sympathetic toward the Zionist movement. In April 1933, it urged the Ministry of the Interior to grant multiple exit and re-entry visas to German Zionist officials so that their work might be facilitated. A Foreign Office report in September 1933, noted that Palestine was the most important and most decisive Einwanderungsland for German Jewry. The

33 Hitler referred to a future, violent "final solution" in his speech of 13 August 1920 in Munich, and in a speech in Rosenheim on 17 April 1921. See: Phelps, "grundlegende Rede," pp. 417-18; BA: NS/26-51.


35 Adam, pp. 15, 108; Walter Petwardic, Die Autoritäre Anarchie (Hamburg, 1946).

36 See: Adam, p. 159. Evidence of the exclusion of the SS and Rosenberg's Aussenpolitisches Amt from the decision-making process in Jewish policy before 1938 can be found in NA: T-175/R588, 000521, II/112 an II/1, 10.VIII.37.


39 PA: Referat-D. Po5 NE adh7, Bd. 1 Bericht über die Lage der jüdischen Flüchtlinge aus Deutschland in den verschiedenen Ländern, September 1933.
German delegation at the League of Nations continued to follow a friendly line toward Zionist work in Palestine until Germany withdrew from the League in October 1933.\textsuperscript{40} The two sections within the Foreign Office responsible for the Zionist movement and Palestine, Referat Deutschland and the Orient-Abteilung, supported the Zionist objective of promoting Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine. Three successive Referenten in the Orient-Abteilung (Pol. III before 1936, and Pol. VII thereafter), Schmidt-Rolke (1933-1934), Pilger (1934-1937), and von Hentig (1937-1940), were in varying degrees favorably disposed to Zionist efforts, as was Foreign Minister von Neurath.\textsuperscript{41} In a Foreign Office circular of February 1934, drawn up by Vicco von Bülow-Schwante of Referat-D, it was asserted that much could be gained through cooperation with the Zionist movement, as that movement would be an excellent vehicle through which the trend toward Jewish assimilation could be reversed, and the Jews eventually removed from Germany.\textsuperscript{42}

Both the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economics were instrumental in concluding the Haavara Transfer Agreement with Zionist officials from Palestine late in the summer of 1933. The original idea for an agreement between Germany and Zionist circles in Palestine pre-dates Hitler's assumption of power and the beginning of anti-Jewish measures in Germany. In 1931, the Brüning government imposed a ban on the removal of capital from Germany because of the world economic crisis. In 1932, Mr. Sam Cohen of Hanotaiah Ltd. of Tel Aviv initiated negotiations with the German government in an effort to permit German Jews emigrating to Palestine to transfer at least part of their assets in the form of German exports.\textsuperscript{43} Negotiations continued after Hitler came to power, as the same restrictions on the removal of assets from Germany prevailed after January 1933.

The most persistent proponent of the transfer approach was Heinrich Wolff, the German Consul-General in Jerusalem from 1932 to 1935. Wolff was sympathetic toward Zionist efforts in Palestine, and worked to make the emigration of Jews from Germany to Palestine as smooth as possible.\textsuperscript{44} He was

\textsuperscript{40}PA: Pol. Abt. III. Politik 5-Palästina, Bd. 5. "Das jüdische Nationalheim in Palästina" von Dr. Julius Ruppel, III 0 1952-33, Mai 1933. See also: Jüdische Rundschau, Nr. 79/80, 4.X.33.

\textsuperscript{41}Ernst Marcus, "The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question in the Period 1933-1939," Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958): 183, 186-87.


\textsuperscript{43}PA: Sonderreferat-W. Finanzwesen 16, Bd. 2, Statement by Mr. Sam Cohen to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency Bulletin, 27 September 1933.

opposed to the anti-Semitic policies of the regime, and was eventually dismissed from active service in September 1935, because his wife was Jewish. Late in April 1933 Wolff began his tireless efforts to achieve a transfer arrangement suitable to both the Zionists and the Hitler regime. He received the backing of responsible authorities in the Foreign Office and the Economics Ministry, especially in its section for foreign currency control, the Reichsstelle für Devisenbewirtschaftung. Negotiations for a transfer agreement were resumed in Berlin in May 1933. They were conducted by Mr. Sam Cohen of Hanotaiah Ltd., and Dr. Hans Hartenstein of the Ministry of Economics, with the full support of the Minister of Economics, Alfred Hugenberg, and of Hjalmar Schacht of the Reichsbank. A preliminary agreement was signed in July, and a final agreement was concluded late in August by representatives of the Ministry of Economics, Hanotaiah, the Anglo-Palestine Bank of Tel Aviv, the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland.

According to the agreement, blocked Jewish assets in Germany were deposited in a special account of the Haavara Ltd. at the Reichsbank. Importers in Palestine who wished to purchase German goods deposited the cost amount of the goods in złoty with the Anglo-Palestine Bank, the banking section of Haavara Ltd. in Palestine. About half of that amount was transferred to the Reichsbank in Germany. The goods were paid for in Reichsmark from the blocked assets of Jewish emigrants, and the emigrants in turn received partial compensation for their blocked assets from the Haavara Ltd. when they arrived in Palestine. This compensation came from the remainder of the initial purchase funds originally deposited by Palestinian importers. On the German side, the advantages of the Haavara agreement were outlined by the Ministry of Economics in its August 28th circular. Jewish emigration would be promoted without a corresponding flight of capital. German exports would be increased, and, although they would not earn their full value in much-needed foreign currency, jobs in Germany’s export industries would be promoted. At the same time, a wedge would be


46 PA: Sonderreferat-W. Finanzwesen 16, Bd. 1. Schnellbrief an das RWM vom 24.VI.33; RWM an AA/Berlin, Nr. Dev. I 31328.33, 22.VII.33; and RWM an die Firma Hanotaiah Ltd. in Palästina, Dev. I 20111/33, 19.V.33.

Driven into the world-wide boycott of German goods. The agreement began functioning in November 1933, and was used as a vehicle for the promotion of Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine until December 1939. It represented a first step in a rather uneven six-year process whereby the Zionist movement was utilized by the Hitler regime to solve the so-called Jewish question in Germany.

The Foreign Office continued to work with the Ministry of the Interior and the ZVfD throughout 1934 and 1935 to ensure that the Zionist movement in Germany was able to function effectively. The ZVfD was encouraged by the Foreign Office, the Interior Ministry and the Gestapo to send delegates to the 18th Zionist Congress in Prague in August/September 1933, and to the 19th Congress in Lucerne two years later. Both the Interior Ministry and the Justice Ministry backed the policies followed by the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economics toward the Zionists. Dr. Hans Frank, the Bavarian Minister of Justice, indicated his support for the Zionist option in a speech at the Reichsparteitag at Nürnberg in October 1933. He asserted that a Jewish national home in Palestine would solve the Jewish question for Jews and gentiles alike. Dr. Bernhard Lösener, director of the Judenreferat in the Ministry of the Interior, was an avid supporter of the Zionist option. Support from the Interior Ministry was crucial for the Zionist cause in Germany because the Ministry, through its Reichsstelle für das Auswanderungswesen, was the agency which controlled the actual emigration process.

Control and regulation of Zionist and other Jewish organizations inside Germany was the responsibility of Himmler's SS, and its subsidiary Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst (SD). However these agencies did not assume a decisive role in the formulation of Jewish policy until 1938/1939.

An SS position paper, circulated in June 1934, was the first indication of active SS participation in the execution of Jewish policy. The SS recommended the promotion of mass Jewish emigration, and warned of the difficulty of persuading the strongly assimilationist Jews of Germany to leave the country.


49 Jüdische Rundschau, Nr. 79/80, 4.X.33.

50 Ibid., Nr. 97, 3.XII.35. For more on the cooperation of the Ministry of the Interior with the Zionist organization in Germany, see Arthur Prinze, "The Role of the Gestapo in Obstructing and Promoting Jewish Emigration," Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958): 206.

The paper also proposed a positive effort by the government and the Party to encourage Zionist initiatives in Germany; these initiatives were intended to instill a sense of Jewish identity in German Jews, and to promote emigration to Palestine. Jewish schools, athletic groups, institutions, culture, etc., in short, all Jewish groups and activities which promoted a Jewish identity, were to be encouraged by the government and the Party. These efforts, along with the Umschulungslager, or occupational retraining centers for Jewish emigrants heading for Palestine, established throughout Germany by the German Zionist movement, were to be supported by the SS.

Subsequent police practice under SS direction left no doubt that the aim was the speedy and efficient emigration of Jews from Germany. This was evident in the preferential treatment directly and indirectly accorded to Jewish organizations promoting emigration, as opposed to that accorded to the assimilationist groups. In January 1935, the Bavarian political police ordered preferential treatment for all Zionist-affiliated organizations. On 10 February, Heydrich ordered the prohibition of speeches and activities which counseled Jews to remain in Germany. Throughout 1935, the SD was in the business of attending and regulating Jewish gatherings and meetings, censoring speeches and banning anything which counseled Jews to remain in Germany. On the other hand, the SD encouraged Zionist propaganda and activities. A general ban on all Jewish meetings of a political nature was issued by the Gestapo on 31 May 1935, although local Jewish cultural and sport activities as well as the activities of the Zionist organizations, were exempt from this ban. A working relationship developed between the SS and the Revisionist Zionists, or Staatszionisten, during those years. In the SS newspaper Das Schwarze Korps, Heydrich again outlined SS support for Zionist efforts to move German Jews to Palestine. Late in 1935, strongly assimilationist, or deutschnationale, organizations such as the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden and the Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten were dissolved, while the activities of the more moderate Central-Verein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens were restricted and its name changed

57 Das Schwarze Korps, 14.V.35, and 26.IX.35.
to the Central-Verein der Juden in Deutschland. The Zionist organization was the only Jewish organization of a political nature which was allowed to continue functioning. In a 1957 interview, Dr. Hans Friedenthal, former chairman of the Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland, revealed that the Gestapo did all it could to promote Jewish emigration to Palestine, thereby rendering considerable assistance to the Zionist cause.\(^{58}\)

The occupational retraining of German Jews emigrating to Palestine was taken up seriously by German Zionists almost immediately after Hitler's assumption of power. The Palestinian economy needed agricultural workers and craftsmen; however, the social, economic and occupational level of most German Jews meant that they were ill-prepared for a new life in Palestine. As a result, rigorous training programs were set up with the approval and encouragement of the police authorities. They were designed primarily for Jewish youth who had not yet gone into business or the professions, in order to teach them the necessary agricultural and occupational skills which were in demand in Palestine. By 1935, an extensive system of retraining centers (Umschulungslager), run by the Hechaluz and sponsored by the various Zionist groups and relief agencies, was functioning throughout Germany.

The above-mentioned SS position paper of June 1934, referred favorably to the Umschulungslager, and this position was reiterated by the Bavarian political police in January 1935. The Foreign Office and the Interior Ministry gave their support to the retraining efforts from 1933 on, provided these activities took place within the borders of Germany under close government supervision.\(^{59}\) The Agriculture Ministry and the Ministry of Labor were also in favor of the retraining concept.\(^{60}\) Throughout 1935 and 1936, German police authorities permitted the Jewish Agency in Palestine to send instructors from Palestine to Germany to help prepare Jewish emigrants for settlement in Palestine. Many of the instructors were teachers of the Hebrew language, specially trained to prepare

\(^{58}\) IfZ: Eichmannprozess-Beweisdokumente. Nr. 742. Interview of Dr. Hans Friedenthal by Dr. Jacob-Ball Kaduri, March 1957.

\(^{59}\) PA: Referat D. Po5 NE adh6, Bd. 3. Schnellbrief, AA/Berlin an RIM, das Preussische Ministerium des Innern, und das Polizeipräsidium. 18.VII.33; RIM an AA/Berlin, Nr. IA 2000/18.8, 28.VIII.33; Preussische Ministerium des Innern an die Herren Regierungspräsidenten und den Herrn Polizeipräsident in Berlin, V.E. 1086, 7.X.33; and Inland II A/B, 83-21, Bd. 1. RIM an den Herrn Reichsminister für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft, IV 5/12/11.5, 83-21, 13/6, 13.VI.34.

\(^{60}\) PA: Inland II A/B. 83-21, Bd. 3. Reichsministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft an das RIM, IV/6-2517, 29.VI.35; and der Arbeitsminister an den Reichsminister des Innern, IIc 7096/35, 13.IX.35.
adolescents and children for their new country. The Gestapo on the German end, and the German Consulate-General on the Palestine end were most accommodating in getting Jewish Agency instructors to Germany.  

The Judenreferat in the SD contained a special section, II/112-3 which dealt exclusively with the Zionist movement and Jewish emigration. Under the direction of Adolf Eichmann, II/112-3 maintained a network of contacts in the Middle East which included both Jews and Arabs. One such agent was Mr. Feival Polkes of the underground Jewish intelligence service in Palestine, the Hagana. Polkes was brought to Berlin early in 1937 for talks with SD and Gestapo officials; these talks were held between 26 February and 2 March 1937. Polkes clarified his and the Hagana's political aims and motivations; they were working for massive Jewish immigration into Palestine and the creation of a strong Jewish majority and state. He offered to share Hagana intelligence information with the SD in return for intensified SD efforts to facilitate Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine. Eichmann was receptive to Polkes' proposals, for he hoped to obtain information on alleged Jewish plans to assassinate German officials, including Hitler. He was assigned the task of developing the Polkes contact, and accepted an invitation from Polkes to visit Jewish settlements in Palestine later that year. He was also authorized to promise Polkes that the SD would direct emigrating Jews to Palestine whenever possible, although this was a rather shallow promise as German officials had little control over the final destinations of Jewish refugees from Germany.

The Eichmann-Polkes talks in Berlin also reveal that the Hagana had received shipments of Mauser pistols from Germany in 1935 and 1936. The exact source of these weapons within Germany is difficult to determine; it is certain, however, that some agency in Germany did provide the Hagana with Mauser pistols, and that the police authorities were aware of it.


65 Eichmann went to Egypt and Palestine in October 1937. He was unable to obtain a visa to enter Palestine, and met with Polkes again in Cairo. Nothing came of the meeting or the contact with Polkes. See: IfZ: Eichmannprozess- Beweisdokumente, Nr. 2. Bericht über die Palästina- Ägyptenreise von SS' Hptscharf. Eichmann und St.-O'Scharf. Hagen, 4.XI.37.

Publication of the Peel Commission Report on Palestine in July 1937, shattered the consensus of opinion in government and Party circles in Germany on the Zionist movement. A Royal Commission under Lord Peel was sent to Palestine in November 1936, to investigate the causes of the Arab revolt of 1936, and to recommend solutions to the post-war strife between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The Commission report, published on 7 July 1937, recommended the termination of the British Mandate over most of Palestine, and the partition of the country into nominally independent Jewish and Arab states. The possibility of an independent Jewish state in Palestine brought previous policies on Zionism under question in Germany, and generated considerable debate in government and Party circles over past and future emigration policies. The idea of an independent Jewish state revived the spectre of an international Jewish conspiracy operating from its own independent power base in Palestine; it also revived the theories of Dühring and Chamberlain, and the early theories of Rosenberg, on the role of Zionism in that conspiracy.

Although the recommendations of the Peel Commission were not published until July 1937, there was much speculation beforehand in Europe and the Middle East that the recommendations might include an independent Jewish state in Palestine. The German Foreign Office was aware of this possibility as early as 9 January. Walther Hinrichs of Referat Deutschland warned the office of the State Secretary that an independent Jewish state might emerge from the Peel Commission deliberations. He criticized the past indifference of the Foreign Office to the possibility of a Jewish state, and suggested that government and Party agencies be made aware of the strategic and ideological dangers posed by an independent Jewish state. He argued that a Jewish state would constitute a power base for the international Jewish conspiracy, much as Moscow was for the Comintern and the Vatican for Catholicism. He also suggested a reexamination of previous emigration policies, specifically of Zionist emigration from Germany to Palestine. Bülow-Schwante of Referat-D argued that an independent Jewish state would be admitted to the League of Nations, and would attach itself to the coalition of states hostile to the new Germany.

The growing alarm within the German government over the possibility of an independent Jewish state did not result in a move to completely end Jewish emigration to Palestine. The positions taken by the various agencies involved in Jewish policy indicate that previous policies had specifically favored Zionist emigration to Palestine over emigration to


68 PA: Büro des Chefs der AO. Judenstaat-Palästina, Aufzeichnung des Ref. D (Bülow-Schwante) vom 27.IV.37.
other destinations. Instead, Referat-D, the Orient-Abteilung (Pol. VII) and Ministerialdirektor von Weizsäcker of the Politsche Abteilung in the Foreign Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and Consul-General Döhle in Jerusalem favored less concentration on Zionism as a vehicle and Palestine as a destination for Jewish emigration from Germany. They argued that emigration policy should seek to scatter Jews around the world, rather than to concentrate them in one specific area such as Palestine, where they might contribute to the creation of an independent Jewish state. Both Döhle and Referat-D were critical of the Haavara agreement because it facilitated large-scale Jewish emigration to Palestine. They also suggested that past support for Zionism had cost Germany the natural sympathy of the Arab world, and they recommended a more positive German approach to Arab aspirations in Palestine and elsewhere.

On the other hand, the economic section of the Foreign Office, the Handelspolitische Abteilung, and the Ministry of Economics strongly supported Jewish emigration to and concentration in Palestine. They favored a continuation of the Haavara arrangement because of its positive impact on German exports to Palestine and the Middle East. They were less concerned about the strategic and ideological consequences of a Jewish state, wishing to maintain an increasing flow of German exports to Palestine through Jewish emigration.

In spite of rumors, no one in the German government knew with certainty what the outcome of the Peel Commission's deliberations would be. On 24 May, a meeting was held at the Foreign Office, attended by representatives of Referat-D, Pol. VII, the Handelspolitische Abteilung and the Auslandsorganisation. It was decided that policy guidelines would be issued to the German Embassies in London, Rome and Bagdad, and to the German Consulate-General in Jerusalem. These guidelines would, however, avoid the specifics of emigration policy and Zionism. They would simply be a statement on Germany's position toward an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Once the recommendations of the Commission were made public, the complex issue of emigration policy would be resolved. There was an awareness that emigration policy, and with it, policy toward the Zionist movement, would require a comprehensive reexamination with the participation of other interested ministries and agencies, and that decisions would have to be made by the highest authorities, including Hitler himself.


70 Inland II A/B. 83-21a, Bd. 1a,Aufzeichnung von WIII an Ref. D, zu 83-21a 16/4, 11.VI.37.

The guidelines issued by Foreign Minister von Neurath on 1 June stressed Germany's opposition to the creation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine.\footnote{ADAP: D, V, Nr. 661.} It was asserted that such a state would serve as a political base for international Jewry, much as the Vatican was for Catholicism and Moscow for the Comintern. Besides suggesting a less cooperative approach to the Zionists, and a more sympathetic response to Arab national aspirations as a means of curbing the growth of Jewish power in Palestine, the guidelines indicated that emigration policies and the Haavara agreement would be reexamined when the findings and recommendations of the Peel Commission were published. Referat-D prepared the way for a reexamination in its circular of 22 June, distributed to all German consular missions abroad.\footnote{Ibid., Nr. 564.} The circular criticized past emphasis on removing Jews from Germany without regard to the impact of their destination on Germany's strategic position. It asserted that emigration policy was not merely a domestic matter of removing Jews from Germany, but that it was also a foreign policy question due to the impact of Jewish immigration into other countries. The circular observed that domestic emigration policy might have to be altered in order to eliminate the foreign policy disadvantages it had created. That policy had concentrated German Jews in Palestine, thus contributing to Jewish strength in Palestine, and to the possibility of a Jewish state.

There was little that Germany could do to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Initiatives which might have had some impact on events in Palestine were not taken. Germany refused to participate in international discussions on Palestine, no doubt because she feared making Jewish policy the subject of debate at an international conference.\footnote{Ibid., Nr. 567 (with footnote No. 1).} Material assistance to the Arabs was rejected for fear of provoking British hostility.\footnote{Ibid., Nr. 566, 570, 571, 574, 638 (footnote No. 2), 644 (footnote No. 1).} Nor was Germany willing to pressure the anti-Semitic governments of Poland and Rumania to change their unconditional support for massive Zionist emigration to Palestine and the creation of a large independent Jewish state.\footnote{PA: Pol. Abt. I-Völkerbund. Mandate-Tätigkeit der Mandatskommision. DK/Genf an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 114/6, 6.X.36; Mandate-allgemeines, Bd. 1, DK/Genf an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1940, 10.XI.36; Länderakten-Palästina, Bd. 1. DK/Genf an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1334, 11.X.37; Inland II A/B, 83-26 Polen, DB/Narschau an AA/Berlin, P I 11a/1/37, 22.I.37; Pol. Abt. V, Politik 36-Polen, "Die Frage der Teilung in polnischem Licht," DNB-Bericht, 5.VII.37; Gesandtschaft Bukarest, TA3 (Fach 37), Bd. 1, DG/Bukarest an AA/Berlin, Tgb. Nr. 1946/37 (XE-13), 28.VIII.37; Inland II A/B, 83-21a, Bd. 1a, AA/Berlin an RIM, e.o. 83-21a 17/8, 17.VIII.37; Pol. Abt. VII, Politik 5a-Palästina, D1269.} Instead, emigration policy and Haavara became the
focus of debate in government and Party circles during the second half of 1937 and early in 1938. The extent to which Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine, and the transfer of Jewish assets via Haavara facilitated Zionist efforts to build an independent Jewish state were the issues upon which the debate centered.

It is unlikely that anyone in the German government seriously thought that events in Palestine could be decisively influenced by simply changing emigration policies or terminating the Haavara agreement. German Jews comprised only about 20% of the total Jewish immigration into Palestine between 1933 and 1937, and formed a much lower percentage of the total Jewish population of Palestine. The success or failure of the National Home and Zionist aspirations for an independent state depended to a much greater degree upon the masses of Jewish immigrants arriving in Palestine from the ghettos of eastern Europe. Germany could not decisively affect the level of Jewish immigration into Palestine upon which the hopes for a Jewish state ultimately depended. An attempt to reduce or suspend Zionist emigration from Germany to Palestine could never be fatal to Zionist aspirations for a Jewish state.

At the time of the publication of the Peel Commission recommendations in July 1937, there was general agreement among the interested sections and representatives of the German Foreign Office that previous emigration policies, specifically the terms of the Haavara agreement, contributed to Zionist strength in Palestine, and thereby facilitated Zionist efforts to establish a Jewish state. The first ministerial conference on Palestine was held at the Foreign Office on 29 July, three weeks after the publication of the Peel report. Besides the interested Referate in the Foreign Office, the meeting was attended by representatives of the Office of the Stellvertreter des Führers, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Economics, the Reichsbank and Rosenberg's Aussenpolitisches Amt. The representative of the Interior Ministry reported that Hitler, after carefully weighing the various options in emigration policy, had decided that Jewish emigration from Germany was to be promoted by all possible means, and that all destinations, including Palestine were to be utilized to this end. In effect, Hitler's directive to the 29 July conference was a rejection of the argument that the foreign policy consequences of domestic emigration policy warranted a change in that policy.

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78 ADAP: D, V, Nr. 562.

Further talks were held at the Foreign Office on 21 September, and at the Ministry of Economics on the twenty-second. The tenor of these discussions was somewhat different from those held on 29 July. By September, there was no question that Zionist emigration from Germany to Palestine would continue as a result of Hitler's July directive. The meetings considered the economic pros and cons of the Haavara transfer agreement, and ways of revising the agreement to better accommodate the economic interests of Palestinian Arabs and the German Christian communities in Palestine. Little or no concern was expressed over Haavara's contribution to Zionist strength and the possibility of a Jewish state. The Interior Ministry emphasized that any revision of the Haavara agreement, or reduction in the volume of its transactions, should not be allowed to adversely affect the total volume of Jewish emigration from Germany, and thereby frustrate the aim of Hitler's July directive.

By the fall of 1937, obstacles to Jewish immigration into Palestine were viewed by some with greater alarm than fears of abetting a Jewish state with immigrants and assets from Germany. Total Jewish immigration into Palestine had fallen off considerably in 1936 and 1937 as a result of the violence of the Arab revolt, and the general political uncertainty surrounding the Peel Commission. After the publication of the Peel report in July 1937, the Arab revolt broke out again with renewed vigor. A substantial decrease in Jewish immigration into Palestine resulted, and with it, a decrease in the level of Jewish emigration from Germany to that country. This decline prompted the Ministry of the Interior to summon another ministerial conference on Palestine on 18 October. At the meeting, the

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82 BA: R/18-5514. RIM an Stellvertreter des Führers, AA, RWM und SD, IB 191g/5012d, 7.X.37; and RIM an RWM, Nr. IB 191 IVg/5012d, 14.X.37.
Interior Ministry noted with alarm the overall decline in Jewish emigration from Germany in 1937. It further suggested that the Haavara agreement be terminated because it was no longer capable of fulfilling its intended task of promoting Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine. Bernhard Lösener of the Interior Ministry noted that Hitler's July directive for all-out Jewish emigration, frustrated by the new realities in Palestine, had neutralized the effectiveness of Haavara; he also asserted that Palestine would continue to be utilized as a destination country for Jewish emigrants from Germany. Finally, there was general agreement at the meeting that the Umschulungs- lager and other retraining programs for Jewish emigrants should continue to function.

By the end of 1937, German fears of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, along the lines recommended by the Peel Commission, had all but disappeared. Arab violence, and the consequent immigration restrictions imposed by British authorities in Palestine, as well as a general dissatisfaction with or rejection of the plan among Jews, Arabs and British officials, made implementation of the Peel recommendations more and more unlikely. Werner-Otto von Hentig of Pol. VII, as well as Weizsäcker and Bismarck of the Politische Abteilung, Consul- General Döhle and the Handelspolitische Abteilung discounted the possibility of Britain ever being able to implement the partition scheme.

The fate of the Haavara agreement had been effectively separated from the question of Jewish emigration to Palestine since Hitler's July directive on Jewish emigration. In the subsequent discussions of September and October, it was understood that Jewish emigration to Palestine would still be promoted as part of the general emigration process. Indicative of this is the permission granted to the Adriatica-Societa Anonima de Navigazione of Venice late in November to promote in Germany Jewish emigration to Palestine via Italian harbors.

Sometime in January 1938, Hitler again intervened in the on-going discussions on Haavara and Jewish emigration to Palestine. He made a specific commitment to Zionist emigration to Palestine during discussions with Alfred Rosenberg, asserting


that Zionism should be utilized to its fullest extent in the overall emigration process.\textsuperscript{86} Three former Zionist officials have verified Hitler's January 1938, decision on Palestine.\textsuperscript{87} Further evidence can be obtained from two Gestapo memoranda of February and March 1938, which allude to the erwünschte weitere Abwanderung deutscher Juden nach Palästina.\textsuperscript{88} After a steep decline in 1937, the number of German Jewish immigrants into Palestine increased sharply in 1938 and the first half of 1939, partly as a result of renewed German support for the efforts of the German Zionist movement.

Hitler's initiatives in 1937 and early in 1938 in the emigration question and Palestine can best be understood in terms of Uwe Dietrich Adam's phrase Hitlers Verknüpfung von Kriegsplanung und Rassenpolitik.\textsuperscript{89} There is little likelihood that Hitler troubled himself to any extent with the theories and arguments of those involved in the debate over Palestine in 1937; nor is there any evidence that he expected an independent Jewish state to emerge as a result of the Peel Commission recommendations, or that he believed that German emigration policy affected the course of events in Palestine one way or the other. There can be little doubt, however, that Hitler's initiatives in all aspects of Jewish policy, especially after 1937, were prompted by the ideological requirements of a National Socialist Weltanschauung which made racial doctrine the ultimate basis of German foreign policy. That foreign policy was geared toward an eventual war for the achievement of a new racial order in Europe; its prerequisite was a new racial order in Germany. However, by early 1938, this had not yet been accomplished. The decision to continue pushing Jews to Palestine was part of an effort in 1938 and 1939 to complete the new racial order in Germany before embarking on a


\textsuperscript{87}See: Marcus, p. 193; Transcript of the Trial in the Case of the Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf, the Son of Karl Adolf Eichmann in the District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61 (Washington, D.C., 1962), card no. 16, 15th session, 25 April 1961 (testimony of Dr. Benno Cohen of the Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland); and Feilchenfeld et al., p. 32.

\textsuperscript{88}BA: Schumacher File 240/II. Geheimes Staatspolizei/ Staatspolizeistelle Würzburg, B. Nr. 1130/38 IIB, 28.II. 38; and PA: Inland II A/B. 83-24a, Bd. 2. Geheime Staatspolizei an AA/Berlin, Nr. IIB 3-F. 455, 29.III.38.

\textsuperscript{89}Adam, p. 159.
war for a new racial order in Europe. It was to be accomplished through the final elimination of Jewish participation in the economy, and through the forced mass-emigration schemes of the SS.

On several occasions after 1933, Hitler expressed his intention to wage war to achieve his aims in Europe. In his speech before the Reichswehr generals on 3 February 1933, his address to an assembly of Gauleiter and Party officials in Munich in September 1935, his memorandum announcing the Four-Year Plan in August 1936, and his famous Reichskanzlei meeting of 5 November 1937, Hitler indicated that he would go to war in the near future. He also believed that a domestic consolidation was a prerequisite to waging war successfully. As early as 1924, Hitler had asserted that only nach dem innern Sieg would Germany be in a position to break die eiserne Fessel seines äusseren Feindes. In his Zweites Buch, Hitler described the racial foundations of National Socialist foreign policy objectives, and the domestic pre-conditions for the success of that policy. In January, 1937, Hitler again referred to the necessary domestic ends in the Jewish question for the successful attainment of Germany’s future political and military objectives. Finally, in a speech in Munich on 24 February 1938, Hitler alluded to imagined gains reaped by world Jewry in past wars, and indicated that the Jews of Germany would no longer be in a position to aid the conspiracy from within.

By early 1938, the Jews of Germany had already been removed from the political, social and cultural life of the nation as a result of legislation between 1933 and 1935. Yet, with some restrictions, Jewish participation in the economy continued to be tolerated through 1937. Moreover, there were still some 350,000 Jews in Germany by the end of 1937, although upwards of 130,000 had emigrated by the early weeks of 1938. The so-called Jewish question had not yet been solved in Germany after five years of Nazi rule; this fact was evident to the Nazi leadership as it prepared for a war which would dramatically transform the scope of that question.


Ibid., p. 805.
Helmut Genschel characterizes the period 1933 to 1937 as one of schleichende Judenverfolgung in economic affairs, and the period from 1938 until the war as the offene Ausschaltung aus der Wirtschaft. Some aryranization of Jewish businesses had occurred between 1933 and 1937, although much of it had involved voluntary sales, in many cases under pressure, by Jews seeking to emigrate. Anti-Jewish legislation during those years was directed primarily against professionals and civil servants rather than against those engaged in economic activities. By late 1937, less than 25% of Jewish businesses had been aryranized and by 1 April 1938, there still existed some 40,000 Jewish enterprises in the Altreich. This essay will not undertake a lengthy analysis of the various anti-Jewish economic measures enacted in 1938 and 1939. Besides satisfying Nazi fantasies about internal consolidation and security, and the unity of the racial community, the expropriation of Jewish assets provided the regime with an added source of revenue with which to pay for armaments and the preparations for war. Hitler also hoped that further pauperization would induce the remaining Jews in Germany to emigrate.

Changes in emigration procedures involved a greater role for the Gestapo and the SD, the two SS agencies interested in Jewish policy. These were designed to speed up the removal of Jews from Germany, and thereby consolidate the domestic front for a future war. It has already been observed that the SS agencies had little or no influence on the formulation of Jewish policy through 1937. Their peripheral position was by no means self-imposed; this is evident in a comprehensive report on the Jewish question in Germany compiled by Department II/112 of the SD in January 1937. The report emphasized that the rapid emigration of Jews from Germany should be the Leitgedanke of all efforts in the Jewish question. It recommended the concentration of German Jews in Palestine and in several South American countries. Finally, disenchantment was expressed over the chaotic manner of policy formulation, and over the multiplicity of competing authorities and policies in Jewish affairs. The report recommended technical changes and improvements in the formulation and conduct of Jewish policy in order to hasten the removal of Jews from Germany, calling for the complete centralization of authority under one agency. There can be no doubt that II/112 was proposing the transfer of authority in Jewish affairs from the responsible government ministries to the agencies of the SS.

96 Genschel, pp. 139 ff.
97 Ibid., chpts. 8, 9, 10, 11; and Adam, chpts. 4, 5.
II/112 continued its campaign through 1937 to enhance the role of the SS in the formulation of Jewish policy, and to promote its recommendations for stepped-up Jewish emigration to specific areas of concentration, namely Palestine and South America. The Anschluss of Austria afforded the SD an opportunity to put its recommendations to work. On 16 March 1938, Adolf Eichmann of section II/112 of the SD was assigned to Vienna with the task of setting up a branch office of II/112, and was given full authority and control over the organization and execution of Jewish emigration to Austria. It is significant that Eichmann had been in charge of II/112-3, the section in II/112 responsible for Zionism and Jewish emigration. The SS assumed immediate and full control over emigration policy in Austria at a time when the various government and Party agencies were still competing for control in the Altreich. All other aspects of Jewish policy in Austria were subordinated to the aim of rapid, mass Jewish emigration. In accordance with the 1937 recommendations of II/112, a Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung (Central Office for Jewish Emigration) was opened in Vienna. What would have taken weeks or months of running from one agency to another was accomplished in one day by Eichmann's Zentralstelle. Jews were concentrated in Vienna, interned in camps and eventually forced through the Zentralstelle where they were stripped of their assets and received in a matter of hours the stamps, papers, visas and passports necessary for leaving the country. Neither the disposal or transfer of assets, nor the securing of a valid immigration visa for another country were necessary elements in the emigration process any longer.

The SD was also in the process of securing for itself an important role in emigration policy in the Altreich by the summer of 1938. It was bolstered by the "success" of its radical emigration procedures in Austria. By November 1938, the Zentralstelle in Vienna had forced the emigration of some 50,000 Austrian Jews; in little more than half a year, the Eichmann system had removed considerably more Jews from Austria than had ever been removed from the Altreich in an entire year. After the Kristallnacht in November, Jewish policy was centralized under the authority of Göring, who, in turn placed emigration policy under the control of Heydrich and the SD. The emigration of Jews from the Altreich was to be...


organized according to the procedures established by Eichmann in Vienna. A Reichszentrale für die jüdische Auswanderung was established in Berlin under Heydrich early in 1939, and it coordinated its efforts with Eichmann's Vienna operation. By early 1939, the SS was in full control of Jewish emigration, responsible only to Göring and ultimately to Hitler.

While efforts to increase Jewish emigration were underway in Greater Germany in 1938, immigration opportunities into other countries for German and Austrian Jews were rapidly declining. Entry into Palestine had been severely restricted by the British as a result of the unrest and violence between 1936 and 1938; moreover, the countries of the western world demonstrated their reluctance after 1937 to raise their immigration quotas to meet the growing refugee crisis. Eichmann's emigration operation in Vienna severely aggravated an already acute Jewish refugee problem by the end of 1938.

Britain's restrictive immigration policy rather than the spectre of a Jewish state was the major problem in Palestine confronting the SD as it assumed control over Jewish emigration in 1938 and 1939. Its task was to secure the rapid emigration of Jews from Greater Germany, and to utilize Palestine as one of the preferred destinations for German and Austrian Jews. Immediately after the Kristallnacht in November 1938, all Jewish political organizations, including the Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland and the Central-Verein were dissolved. The violence of the Kristallnacht had also resulted in the destruction of the Berlin Palästinaamt, the Zionist office which processed Jewish emigrants going to Palestine. However, when the violence passed, and the SS was in full control of emigration policy, Zionist functions resumed throughout Germany, albeit under the altered circumstances dictated by the new emigration procedures of the SD. The SD immediately provided assistance to German Zionists in restoring the working operation of the Palästinaamt, helping to recover immigration certificates which had already been granted by British authorities in Palestine. In Berlin and in Vienna, the SD ordered the release from jail of all Jews arrested during the Kristallnacht who were in any way connected with the Palästinaamt.

The SD and the Gestapo participated in the organization of the so-called "illegal" immigration of Jewish refugees into Palestine between 1938 and 1940. In 1937, a group of Jewish Labor leaders and Hagana officials in Palestine set up the Mossad le Aliyah Bet (Committee for Illegal Immigration).

104 IfZ: Eichmannprozes=Beweisdokumente, Nr. 742.
Later that year, the Mossad established a base in Paris from which to direct the rescue of Jewish refugees from central Europe and their "illegal" immigration into Palestine. Mossad agents were assigned to Berlin and Vienna in 1938, with instructions to establish a working relationship with the SD and the Gestapo in organizing the clandestine movement of Jewish refugees from central Europe to Palestine. Their tasks included coordinating transports in Germany and Austria, selecting and organizing those Jews willing to leave via the illegal route, and cooperating with Nazi authorities without whom there could be no emigration. Ehud Avriel, a former Mossad agent in Vienna, characterizes the attitude of German police authorities in Vienna as follows:

In pre-war Germany, these operations were neither illegal nor secret. The Gestapo office directly across the street from our own knew exactly where we were and what we were doing. The illegality began only at the shores of Palestine with the British blockade.

The SD and the Gestapo were receptive to the Mossad's initiatives for cooperation. At Göring's conference on the Jewish question on 12 November 1938, Heydrich admitted SD complicity in illegal emigration schemes from Austria. Mossad agents were provided with farms and other facilities to set up vocational training camps for prospective immigrants. Agents in Vienna worked through Wolfgang Karthaus, a high-ranking Austrian Nazi who was sympathetic to the Jewish plight, to secure the cooperation of the Gestapo and of Gauleiter Josef Bürckel. Through them, Yugoslav transit visas were obtained, enabling Austrian Jews to make their way to Palestine via Mossad ships which took on illegal immigrants in Yugoslav ports. Eichmann soon brought the Mossad operation under his control, and urged the movement of greater numbers of "illegals" out of Austria. Jewish refugees were also smuggled down the Danube, through Black Sea ports in Rumania and Bulgaria, and through Greece to Palestine. In 1939, the SD put pressure on the Mossad in Berlin and Prague to move larger numbers of Jews out of the Reich; Heydrich demanded that 400 Jews per week be

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109 Arendt, p. 61; Kimche, pp. 18-19, 32.
110 Avriel, pp. 42 ff.
111 Ibid., pp. 71-72, 89, 91.
prepared and sent off from Berlin. In the summer of 1939, Mossad agent Pino Ginsburg concluded an agreement with the Gestapo in Berlin to move 10,000 Jews by ship from the ports of Emden and Hamburg to Palestine. The outbreak of war in September forced the cancellation of that scheme.

The records of the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State indicate that the British and American governments were aware of the collaboration of German authorities in the illegal movement of Jews from central Europe to Palestine. German authorities pursued both the legal and the illegal routes in their promotion of Zionist emigration to Palestine. In the spring of 1938, the SD and the Ministry of Economics agreed that for the time being, the Haavara system would continue to function, and that funds provided by Jewish relief agencies abroad for emigration purposes would be placed at the disposal of the emigrants. In the Foreign Office, support for SS emigration procedures, legal and illegal, was usually forthcoming, and previous fears of a Jewish state disappeared. It is difficult to determine the exact number of "illegals" brought out of central Europe to Palestine between 1938 and 1940. The estimates that are available cover the total illegal immigration into Palestine, which included large numbers of eastern European Jews not yet under Nazi control.

The forced emigration procedures adopted in 1938 and 1939 did result in a significant rise in the number of Jews forced out of Greater Germany during those years. The legal and illegal emigration procedures established by the agencies of the SS were continued during the early years of the war, although with diminishing success. Immigration possibilities into other countries, already severely restricted in 1938 and 1939, became even more limited under the adverse conditions of war. Moreover, German conquests in 1939 and 1940 brought millions of Jews under Nazi control, making it impossible to remove such large numbers from Europe, even utilizing the methods perfected by Eichmann in Vienna. The SS continued to promote emigration to Palestine, however, and retraining programs for Jews seeking to emigrate to Palestine continued to enjoy the support of the SD, the Foreign Office and the

113 Eichmann Trial: card 20, session 19, 27 April 1961.

114 SD-DF: 840.48 Refugees/671. See also: PRO: FO371-21888-E4405, FO 371/2188-E5244, and FO 371/24239.


117 See above, footnote no. 65.
Ministry of the Interior through 1939 and 1940. Throughout 1940 and much of 1941, German authorities in eastern Europe did nothing to prevent the steady movement, however small, of Jewish refugees to Palestine, and in many cases encouraged it. At his trial in Jerusalem in 1961, Adolf Eichmann testified that he continued to push emigration to Palestine during the early years of the war.

Germany's consistent support for Zionist emigration to Palestine during the 1930s does not provide a direct explanation of the origins and timing of the "final solution." However, an examination and analysis of that policy lend considerable support to the proponents of the argument that systematic plans for the physical liquidation of European Jewry did not exist prior to the early years of World War II. Emigration policy as a whole, particularly the question of Zionist emigration from Germany and eastern Europe to Palestine, reflects a basic uncertainty within the Nazi leadership over the future substance of Jewish policy once the Jewish presence had been eliminated from Germany. There can be no doubt that, from the beginning, Hitler sought what Hans-Adolph Jacobsen has termed the rassische Neuordnung Europas; nevertheless, the method of achieving that end, as well as its timing, remain the subjects of intense debate today.

Few would argue that the Hitler regime pursued the rassische Neuordnung Deutschlands between 1933 and 1939, with Jewish emigration from Germany as the deciding element in that process. A key element in the process was the encouragement of Zionist efforts in Germany, and the promotion of Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine. Certain aspects of this policy indicate that the only goal of emigration in general, and Zionist emigration in particular, was the removal of Jews from Germany and from the rest of Europe. It has been demonstrated above that, the international Jewish conspiracy theory notwithstanding, Adolf Hitler continued to support Jewish emigration to Palestine throughout the 1930s, even after the publication of the Peel Commission report and its recommendations for an independent Jewish state. Moreover, the Hitler regime did not oppose the pro-Zionist policies of the anti-Semitic Polish and Rumanian governments which sought to remove as many Polish and Rumanian Jews as possible to Palestine. In the end, German policy did not attach particular importance to the final overseas destinations of German and eastern European Jewish

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119 PA: Inland II A/B. 83-24, Bd. 3 (the entire file).

120 Eichmann Trial: card 93, session 80, 27 June 1961.
emigrants, so long as those destinations were outside of Europe. The aim appears to have been to move German and European Jewry away from the European continent, specifically to Palestine and to North and South America.

The Jewish question assumed a new dimension in German strategy in 1938 and 1939 with the prospect of war and of conquests in central and eastern Europe. Germany's Jewish question would no longer be a matter of removing some 500,000 Jews from Germany; instead some 11 million Jews would have to be removed from a German-dominated Europe. So long as the Jewish question remained an exclusively German matter in Nazi plans and policies, and emigration the solution, Palestine was considered a desirable and useful outlet for Jewish emigrants. However, by 1938, Nazi political and military objectives were set, and the Jewish question was soon to be transformed into a European phenomenon for the Hitler regime. Due to its small size and limited absorptive capacity, Palestine became an inadequate outlet in German emigration policy; other overseas destinations such as Madagascar and Guyana became serious alternatives to Palestine between 1938 and 1942. In the end, the isolation of Hitler's conquered Europe precluded the feasibility of overseas emigration schemes, large and small, as the solution to the Jewish question; mass-murder remained the only means of eliminating the Jewish presence from Europe, and thus achieving the new racial order.

The intention here is not to deny even the probability of Hitler and others having periodically entertained the idea of mass-murder as a possible final solution to the Jewish question in Europe. It would appear, however, that such a solution was not the fixed, agreed-upon end of Jewish policy between 1933 and 1939. The removal of Jews from Germany and from the rest of Europe was the only fixed aim of German Jewish policy prior to the War, and this is evident in Nazi support for Zionist emigration to Palestine. It is unlikely that that policy was carried out with any other end in mind.

121 This is evident in Hitler's Reichstag speech of 30 January 1939, in which he alluded to the European dimensions of the Jewish question, and to the racial factor as the key element in a new European order. See: Domarus, Vol. II/1, p. 1057. A Foreign Office circular, prepared by Referat-D on 25 January 1939, made the observation that the Jewish question would not be solved for Germany when the last Jew left German soil. See: ADAP: D, V, Nr. 664.

122 There is much evidence on German support for the removal of European Jewry to Madagascar in 1938 and 1939, as well as the specific plans of the German government to concentrate European Jewry on Madagascar between 1940 and 1942. See: Philip Friedman, "The Lublin Reservation and the Madagascar Plan. Two Aspects of Nazi Jewish Policy During the World War," The Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Studies 8 (1953): 171 ff.
ABBREVIATIONS

AA: Auswärtiges Amt
ADAP: Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik
AO: Auslandsorganisation
APA: Aussenpolitisches Amt
BA: Bundesarchiv/Koblenz
CAHJP: Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Hebrew University/Jerusalem
DB: Deutsche Botschaft
DG: Deutsche Gesandtschaft
DGK: Deutsches General-Konsulate
GStA: Geheimes Staatsarchiv/Berlin
IfZ: Institut für Zeitgeschichte/München
IMT: International Military Tribunal
ISA: Israel State Archives/Jerusalem
NA: National Archives/Washington, D. C.
PA: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes/Bonn
Pol. VII: Politische Abteilung VII
PRO: Public Record Office/London
RAM: Reichsaussenminister
Ref. D.: Referat Deutschland
RIM: Reichsministerium des Innern
RWA: Reichswirtschaftsministerium
SD-DF: State Department, Decimal Files, Washington, D. C.
St.S: Staatssekretär
U.St.S: Unterstaatssekretär
ZVfd: Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland